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Case Notes
DENIED BOARDING-THIRD PARTY DAMAGE AWARD-A
Non-Ticket Holder Awaiting her Husband's Arrival at the Airport
Was Entitled to Damages Under Section 404(b) of the Federal
Aviation Act for the Emotional Distress Suffered When She Was
Given No Valid Explanation by the Air Carrier for her Husband's
Failure to Arrive on Schedule. Mason v. Belieu - ------- F. Supp.
--------- 13 Av. L. Rep. 17, 114 (D.D.C. 1974)
Mason, an engineer who was attempting to return to Panama
from Miami after having been forcibly deported earlier in the day,
was denied passage by Pan American Airlines. His rather bizarre
behavior on the deportation flight, such as refusing to leave the
plane so that police had to carry and place him in a wheelchair and
his calling of an airport news conference to air his grievances, re-
sulted in a refusal of carriage on a Panama-bound flight for which
he held a ticket. Mason subsequently made passage on another
airline and arrived in Panama two hours behind schedule.
Mason's wife, who was waiting in Panama, made inquiries of the
carrier as to the whereabouts of her husband when he failed to ap-
pear on his scheduled flight, but her questions were unanswered.
Subsequently, Mason and his wife brought a pro se suit seeking
compensation for mental distress and severe inconvenience caused
by failure to transport Mason and for the emotional distress suf-
fered by Mrs. Mason as a result of her husband's unexplained de-
lay.' Although the suit sounded in both tort and contract, it was
treated by the court' as stating a cause of action under the anti-
discrimination provision of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.'
1 A claim of the Masons' daughter, Lark Mason, was dismissed at pretrial.
Her sole contact with the case was a call from her father in Miami stating that
he would be on a later flight. Lark related this information to her mother when
her mother called home after not finding her husband on the Pan American flight.
2 Mason v. Belieu, - F. Supp. -; 13 Av. L. REP. 17,114 at 17,117 (D.D.C.
1974).
3 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 5§ 1301
et seq. (1970), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973
[hereinafter referred to as "the Act"].
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The court found that section 1111 discretion,' the authority to
refuse passage, was unreasonably exercised, that discrimination was
present as comprehended by section 404(b),' the anti-discrimina-
tion provision, and that Mr. Mason was entitled to actual but not
punitive damages for the outrage and humiliation he suffered in
violation of his right to passage aboard a common carrier! More
importantly, the court expanded the application of section 404(b)
with respect to third parties. Held: A non-ticket holder who was
awaiting her husband's arrival at the airport was entitled to dam-
ages under section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act for the
emotional distress suffered when she was given no valid explanation
by the air carrier for her husband's failure to arrive on schedule.
Mason v. Belieu, 13 Av. L. Rep. 17, 114 (D.D.C. 1974).'
Under section 1111 of the Act,' any carrier, subject to reason-
able rules and regulations, may refuse passage or transportation
when in the opinion of the carrier such transportation would be
inimical to the safety of the flight. On the other hand, section
404(b) of the Act provides that no carrier shall subject a person,
port, or locality, to any unjust discrimination or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.' No court,
prior to Mason, has awarded damages to a third party, non-
passenger, non-ticket holder under the anti-discrimination provi-
sion of the Act. This novel holding is to be distingiushed from
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines," where the court awarded damages
4 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970).
549 U.S.C. 5 1374(b) (1970).
6 13 Av. L. REP. at 17,118.
7Id.
'49 U.S.C. S 1511 (1970).
9 49 U.S.C. S 1374(b) (1970).
"0Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd,
- F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Nader case referred to throughout this note
is the lower court opinion. This opinion was reversed on May 2, 1975. The Sec-
ond Circuit held that the findings of fact with respect to Nader's 404(b) recovery
were based on erroneous legal conclusions regarding the application of section
404(b) to the carrier's priority rules for "bumped" passengers. The court held
that Nader's recovery on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation would be re-
versed and stayed until a determination be made by the C.A.B. whether Alle-
gheny's practices were deceptive.
The third party award on the basis of fraudulent misrepresentation was re-
versed, the court holding that even if the practices were fraudulent, the third
party was not within the class which could recover.
To the extent that the third party award in Mason is based on Nader, Mason
cannot stand on appeal. However, the Nader appeals court never addressed
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to the third party on the basis of an intentional tort. Section
404(b), enacted in 1938 as part of the Civil Aeronautics Act, and
adopted in full in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, provides that:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation
in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port,
locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust
or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatso-
ever."
Examination of legislative discussions on section 404(b) and case
treatment of the section reveals that the intended scope of the
statute has been broadened through judicial interpretation."2 Sec-
tion 404 is entitled "rates for carriage of persons and property,""
and the 400 series of sections is entitled "Air Carrier Economic
Regulations."' " Considering the titles of these sections, and state-
ments by the court in Wills v. Trans World Airlines," there is
nothing to show that the original intent of the section was other
than that the section have application to cases of economic prefer-
ences in terms of rate differentials between persons, not to cases in
the current "civil rights" sense." The court in Wills recognized the
squarely the issue of a third party recovery under 404(b), which is the proposition
for which Mason stands. Such a theory is even more tenuous than the theory
argued in Nader and leads to the conclusion that Mason will similarly not stand
on appeal.
1149 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970).
'2 See Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.
1956); Williams v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1975); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp.
128 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1975); Mortimer v. Delta Air
Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200
F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961); see also H.R. REP. No. 2635, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. 3 (1938), where the House managers submitted the Senate substitute bill
(S. 3845) in place of the House proposal. In summarizing the differences in the
two bills, the managers concluded that Senate sections 403 and 404(b) were com-
parable to House section 404 entitled "Tariffs of Air Carriers."
1349 U.S.C. S 1374 (1970).
1449 U.S.C. § 1371 et seq. (1970).
"Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 363 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
The court stated there that "[flew guidelines exist to aid in determining what
is 'undue or unreasonable preference' and 'unjust discrimination' within the mean-
ing of the Act. No explanation of these terms appears in the record of pre-
enactment Congressional debate, which dealt largely with the question of whether
air regulation should be under the basic control of the Interstate Commerce
Commission or, as proposed, under a separate authority." Id. at 363.
"6 See cases cited note 12 supra.
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paucity of congressional guidance in understanding the intent of
section 404(b). The court pointed out that the legislative history
of section 404 dealt largely with the question of control of air
transportation rather than a delineation of guidelines for deter-
mining what constituted a section 404(b) violation." The eco-
nomic focus of the statute,18 however, has been expanded to pro-
vide a cause of action for discrimination in any form.'"
Section 1111, concerning authority to refuse transportation, was
enacted in 1961 and was added to the 1958 Act under a sub-
chapter entitled "Miscellaneous."2 It provides:
Subject to reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by the Ad-
ministrator, any air carrier is authorized to refuse transportation to
a passenger or to refuse to transport property when, in the opinion
of the air carrier, such transportation would or might be inimical
to the safety of the flight."'
There has been a similar lack of consideration by the courts and
the Congress of this statute and its possible concurrent operation
with section 404(b). Section 1111 was enacted together with a
number of criminal statutes as part of an anti-hijacking bill, and
was added to the 1958 Act.'
The common law rules upon which these statutes are based
have long been that the carrier was bound to receive for carriage,
without discrimination, all proper persons who properly present
themselves for passage.' On the other hand, the carrier could re-
fuse passage to those who were believed to endanger the safety of
the other passengers,' to whom the carrier owes a high duty of
17 Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 363 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
18 See cases cited note 12 supra.
,' Analogizing to the Interstate Commerce Act, this is the conclusion of the
court in Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. at 363. This is relied
on in Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. at 279.
2049 U.S.C. S 1511 (1970).
211d.
22"d.
21 See cases cited notes 24, 25, 26 infra.
"See also Casteel v. American Airways, 261 Ky. 818, 88 S.W.2d 976 (1935);
Hannibal R.R. v. Swift, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 262 (1870); Brumfield v. Consoli-
dated Coach Corp., 240 Ky. 1, 40 S.W.2d 356 (1931).
2See cases cited note 24 supra; Connors v. Cunnard S.S. Co., 204 Mass.
310, 90 N.E. 601 (1910); Owens v. Macon & B.R. Co., 119 Ga. 230, 46 S.E. 87
(1903). See also Pearson v. Duane, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 605 (1866), where it was
held that a common sea carrier may refuse to accept as a passenger a person
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care." The practical operation of these rules was that a person
wrongfully excluded had an action for damages, but the carrier
could defend against the action by offering evidence justifying the
exclusion." Sections 1111 and 404(b) work in the same way. 8
Therefore the logical way to challenge the validity and existence
of section 1111 authority is to bring an action alleging discrimina-
tion under section 404(b).' The more reasonable the carrier's be-
lief of danger in exercising section 1111 authority, the less likely that
the carrier will be held liable for discrimination." While a mere as-
sertion that passage was denied on the basis of section 1111 author-
ity will not exculpate the carrier from possible liability in a 404(b)
action, if evidence justifying refusal is presented, and there exist
no material controverted facts, defendant will be entitled to sum-
mary judgment.31 For example, in Mason, the section 1111 clause
and a clause exculpating carrier from liability when passage was
refused were part of the carrier's tariff and therefore part of the
contract between carrier and passenger."' The reasonableness of the
carrier's belief that exclusion was proper, however, was subject to
consideration in a 404(b) action. In Williams v. Transworld Air-
lines,8 where a fugitive from justice was denied passage and
brought an action under section 404(b), the court took this point
of view noting that tariff restrictions do not allow acts which con-
who has been forcibly banished and expelled from a jurisdiction when the bring.
ing back and landing of such person would cause difficulty. There the passenger
was under threat of death if he was to return.
" See generally Michell v. N.Y. Lake Erie and Western R.R. Co., 146 U.S.
513 (1892); Wilson v. Capital Airlines, 240 F.2d 492 (4th Cir. 1957); Annot.,
73 A.L.R.2d 346 (1960); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1956); Annot., 32 A.L.R.
1190 (1924).
2S. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Lawrence, 100 Ark. 544, 153 S.W. 799
(1913); see Williams v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), afl'd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1975).
2 See generally Williams v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 797
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1975).
21 Williams v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
afl'd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1975).
0 Id.
"See Motion for Summary Judgment for Defendant at 2-4, Mason v. Pan
American World Airways, Civ. Action No. 1340-73 (D.D.C. 1973).
" Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969);
Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); see Rule 15(B),
C.A.B. Tariff No. PR-6 (1972).
11 Williams v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 797 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1975).
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stitute discrimination as contemplated by section 404(b)." There-
fore, section 1111 is a defense to a section 404(b) action.
The cause of action for discrimination under the Act was first
recognized in Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways.' In
Fitzgerald the carrier refused to transport several black ticket
holders and a white passenger who was traveling with them. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found a
cause of action in the Act for the ticket holders, and remanded for
a damage determination. Although Fitzgerald dealt with an award
to passengers, there is a possible hint that section 404(b) might
have application to third parties. The court says, "[tihe latter sec-
tion is for the benefit of persons, including passengers, using the
facilities of air carriers.""
Since Fitzgerald, however, the anti-discrimination provision has
found its greatest application in the passenger "bumping" cases.
These cases, relying on the federal cause of action granted in Fitz-
gerald, have recognized a right to relief under the Act when a
prima facie case of discrimination is made out."' The "bumping"
cases had dealt only with providing a remedy for the aggrieved
passenger until a third party recovered in Nader v. Allegheny Air-
lines8 in 1973. In Nader not only did the ticket holder receive com-
pensatory and punitive damages under section 404(b), but the
citizens' group which Nader was unable to address due to his late
arrival recovered nominal and punitive damages for their mis-
placed reliance on the carrier's representation that Nader would be
transported."9 The court reasoned that Allegheny held itself out and
represented to the public that it uses a reservation system which
will assure a guaranteed seat to a passenger who properly con-
34 Id. at 803.
s5 Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
11 Id. at 501. It is this statement that gives rise to the belief that section 404(b)
might have application to the third party situation. This statement may not
allow the interpretation if "persons" modifies "using the facilities." It is possible
that Mrs. Mason was using the carrier's facilities by being on the carrier's pre-
mises. However, neither the original intent nor the subsequent use of the statute
in the cases has applied the section in this manner until Nader v. Allegheny Air-
lines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1975).
" See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 128, 132 (D.D.C.
1973), rev'd, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1975).
8 Id.
39 Id. at 132-33.
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firms his reservation.' The public is entitled to rely on such repre-
sentations and to recover if injured by misrepresentation.'
The award to Ralph Nader individually was based on section
404(b) and was in line with the previous cases which awarded
damages for unreasonable discrimination. The third party award
in Nader was not, however, based on section 404(b). The third
party damage award in Nader was based on the tort of intentional
misrepresentation, a tort directly against the third party. As Prosser
discusses, there is development in the law toward allowing recovery
by third persons who have relied on defendant's misrepresenta-
tion.' The Nader court spoke of a legal duty which was violated by
an intentional misrepresentation that affected a class of foreseeable
plaintiffs such that recovery was proper." This muddled negli-
gence/intentional tort theory gives recovery to the third party out-
side of section 404(b). The significance of Nader vis-a-vis Mason
lies in a mistaken application of the Nader third party damage
analysis by the Mason court. The distressing aspect of Mason is
that it seems to be authority for the proposition that a third party
may recover for discrimination against another. Notwithstanding
the hint in Fitzgerald that the remedy might be available to third
parties, it is questionable that the Mason decision is properly sup-
portable on section 404(b) alone, if at all.
The court in Mason stated that "although these facts may justify
relief in contract or tort, the Court will follow the usual practice of
treating such cases as stating a cause of action under the more
generous antidiscrimination provision of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, Section 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b)."" Before con-
cluding that plaintiff could recover, however, the court stated:
Mrs. Mason's injuries were genuine but slight .... [S]he did not
learn of her husband's late flight until more than an hour after...
and during that period she was given no valid explanation for her
husband's failure to arrive on that flight to counter her fears....
40Id.
41 Id.
42 See Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231,
246, 250 (1966); see generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,
§§ 105-10 (4th ed. 1971). The development is largely with respect to the com-
mercial business context, but had application to Nader because the plaintiffs were
in the class to which defendant had a duty.
11365 F. Supp. at 133.
44 13 Av. L. REP. at 17,117.
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This emotional distress was directly and foreseeably caused by Pan
American's actions, and justifies an award. .. .'
The difficulty in analyzing the third party recovery in Mason stems
from the inability to determine the theory which plaintiffs pursued.
The plaintiffs' action was pro se and the court allowed the parties
great latitude in their compliance with the pleading details in which
an attorney would demonstrate greater proficiency.' It is lack of
specificity which makes interpretation of Mason especially difficult.
The court equivocally states that a joint cause of action exists
under section 404(b) but uses language of negligence and inten-
tional tort before providing the third party with a remedy. The
court is reluctant to base the third party award solely on the viola-
tion of a federally created right despite the fact that this is the
proposition for which Mason improperly stands. It is possible that
an incorporation of the Nader third party theory is to be assumed
in Mason. In that situation Mason would not be significant except
as a logical extension of Nader. Rather, Mason is independently
significant insofar as it stands for a third party recovery based on
an expansion of 404(b) coverage and not merely a following of
Nader. Supporting this view is the fact that Mason and his wife
were joint plaintiffs on a section 404(b) cause of action.""
Passengers have traditionally had a cause of action for injury in
many forms; non-passengers, like Mrs. Mason, might recover for
an act of direct tortious injury. Since the court was reluctant to
summarily extend section 404(b) coverage, the court found it
necessary to buttress the statutory third part recovery with addi-
tional support from the tort law.
If the necessary elements were present, it is clear that Mrs.
Mason could recover exclusive of the statute for tortious conduct
directed towards her on the basis of traditional tort concepts." A
prima facie case of intentional misrepresentation is made out by
showing a misrepresentation by defendant, scienter, intent to in-
/5 1d. at 17,118.
4' A pro se action is one where the plaintiffs pursue their action without the
assistance of counsel. In the present case the court went out of its way to allow
the plaintiffs to pursue their action. In essence, the court fashioned plaintiffs'
relief for them.
4 Mason v. Belieu, 13 Av. L. REP. at 17,117.
48 Here the suggestion is that Mrs. Mason as the victim of a direct tortious
act would have a traditional action for negligence or intentional tort.
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duce plaintiff's reliance, justifiable reliance by plaintiff, causation,
and damages." In Nader the court held that the third party had
made this case and thus was entitled to recover? ° The facts in
Mason, however, do not meet the criteria for this tort. First of all,
there was no representation at all." While a fraudulent concealment
may be a basis for an action in misrepresentation, the defendant is
usually under no duty to disclose the facts which he knows?'
Secondly, there was no scienter, intent, or reliance in Mason.
Finally, there is a serious problem with the requirement of dam-
ages. Prosser states that misrepresentation requires "that the plain-
tiff must have suffered substantial damage before the cause of
action can arise."'" The damages "must be established with a rea-
sonable certainty and must not be speculative or contingent."' In
fact, Prosser states that the "tort action carries a measure of dam-
ages based to the extent to which the plaintiff is out of pocket as
a result of the misrepresentation.""' The Mason court, in contrast,
stated that Mrs. Mason suffered no "out of pocket expenses.""
Mrs. Mason might also have proceeded on the basis of a negli-
gent misrepresentation, an action which, as Prosser discusses,
differs from intentional misrepresentation only in regard to the
defendant's duty of care."' The cases in this area are generally con-
cerned with representations made by those in the business of sup-
plying information for the guidance of others in business transac-
tions, whose information is expected to be relied upon. 8 Again, the
major stumbling block for the plaintiffs in the present case is that
no representations were made at all. Furthermore, the general rule
is that an action will not lie for tacit nondisclosure in the area of
intentional misrepresentations. 9 This rule is similarly followed in
negligent nondisclosures.
49W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 5 105 (4th ed. 1971).
50365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1975).
5113 Av. L. REP. 17,117.
5'W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, 5 106 (4th ed. 1971).
- Id. S 110.
4Id.
55 Id.
58 13 Av. L. REP. 17,118.
57 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 107 (4th ed. 1971).
58 Id.
11Id. at S 106.
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In either type of misrepresentation action recovery for emotional
disturbance is extremely difficult. The intentional act causing the
emotional distress must be the cause in fact and proximate cause
of a severe emotional disturbance, which in turn is the cause in fact
and proximate cause of physical injuries."0 Alternatively, some
courts have dispensed with the requirement of physical injury if de-
fendant's conduct is sufficiently outrageous."' Regardless of the view,
however, the facts in Mason do not fit the requirements for these
actions. Nor do the facts give rise to emotional distress damages
resulting from a negligent act. The general rule here is that ordi-
narily without physical injury there can be no recovery." "The
temporary emotion of fright," states Prosser, is usually not com-
pensable in the negligence situation as distiguished from the inten-
tional outrageous conduct cases.' Exceptions to the rule requiring
physical injury in the negligence cases have developed in the negli-
gent transmission of a message and the negligent mishandling of
corpses; both are cases where there is a definite likelihood that
mental distress would result."
For reasons similar to those discussed above, it is difficult to
understand how Mrs. Mason could have recovered for intentional
or negligent infliction of mental distress. Carriers have been held
liable for intentional infliction of mental distress,"5 but those cases
involved an affirmative act as opposed to a failure to act as in
Mason. While the law has allowed third party recovery for inten-
tional infliction of mental distress, those recoveries have generally
been limited to cases of physical injury where the plaintiff was
present. 7 In Mason there is no physical harm or language which
60 Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
61 State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282
(1952).
O2W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 54 (4th ed. 1971).
63 Id.
"Id.
"The first cases were based on an implied contract to be polite. Bleeker v.
Colo. & S. Ry., 50 Colo. 140, 114 P. 481 (1911); Knoxville Traction Co. v.
Lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899). The cases then awarded damages
where no resultant physical injury; see Humphrey v. Mich. United Ry., 166
Mich. 645, 132 N.W. 447 (1911); Lipman v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 108 S.C.
151, 93 S.E. 714 (1917).
61W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 12 (4th ed. 1971).
6 Id. Those cases indicate that there have been no recoveries for intentional
infiliction of emotional distress where plaintiff was not present.
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meets the "outrageous conduct" standard articulated by the courts.
Furthermore, the requirement of an "act" is not met. Mrs. Mason
would also have been unable to make out a prima facie case of
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Although the "act" re-
quirement may be satisfied by an omission to act, it is difficult to
find a duty on the part of the carrier towards Mrs. Mason. The
general rule here is that the failure to use due care must subject
plaintiff to actual impact or the threat of physical impact.8 Al-
though the cases impose a high duty of care to passengers, the per-
son attending a passenger is generally regarded as a business in-
vitee or licensee and owed a duty of ordinary care."9 Those hold-
ings, if they apply, dealt with defects and dangers causing injury
and are inapplicable, without tenuous expansion to a situation of
emotional distress without physical injury."0
A passenger traditionally has had a cause of action for a breach
of contract of passage and the emotional distress resulting there-
from.' The passenger also has had a damage action for delay but
only for those damages which were reasonably within the contem-
plation of the carrier at the time of the making of the contract.
T
8 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). See cases
cited at n.93 in W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS, 5 54 (4th ed.
1971).69 Kircher v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 32 Cal. 2d 176, -, 195 P.2d 427, 434
(1948); see generally McCann v. Anchor Line, 79 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1935); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 60-61 (4th ed. 1971); Annot.,
92 A.L.R. 614 (1934). See also Suarez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 498 F.2d
612 (7th Cir. 1974), where the court held that the air carrier is obligated to
exercise a high degree of care not only in the transit stage of its operation, but
in the ticket-selling stage as well. Suarez did, however, intend to become a pas-
senger, a fact not present in the Mason case.
70 As to the cases above which apply to non-passengers, they all deal with
defects and dangers and resultant injuries which are not present in Mason.
71 See Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal. 1961);
Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Freels, 176 Tenn. 502, 144 S.W.2d 743
(1940); Bonner v. Pullman Co., 160 S.C. 631, 159 S.E. 382 (1931); Illinois
Cent. R. Co. v. Hawkins, 114 Miss. 110, 74 So. 775 (1917); Annot., 76 A.L.R.
927 (1932).
72 See, e.g., Morris v. Colorado Ry. Co., 48 Colo. 147, 109 P. 430 (1910).
But see Killian v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 17 (D.C. Wyo. 1957);
Trammel v. Eastern Air Lines, 136 F. Supp. 75 (W.D.S.C. 1955); Jones v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 22 Wash. 2d 863, 157 P.2d 728 (1945). See note 32
supra where it is suggested that the clause exculpating for failure to transport is
merged into the contract at time of purchase. The court in Wills found emotional
distress compensable for violation of a right, 200 F. Supp. at 366, and the court
in Williams intimated that reasonableness of section 1111 authority was subject
to judicial review, and not final according to the opinion of the FAA Administra-
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Here, it is questionable whether the parties would contemplate that
the breach would result in emotional distress to a third party. '
Furthermore, Mrs. Mason does not qualify as a third party bene-
ficiary under her husband's contract with the carrier and thus can-
not recover on that basis.
It is evident that Mrs. Mason could not recover on the basis of
direct tortious injury as did the third party in Nader. Rather, the
court in Mason improperly grounded the third party section
404(b) recovery on the discriminatory acts toward the ticket
holder as well as the failure to provide information to the third
party.' That is, discrimination against the passenger resulted in
third party fears which were held actionable under section
404(b) .'
Analysis of the theories reveals two possible views of the Mason
holding. Either the third party is a victim of a direct tortious act
and entitled to recovery on that basis, or on the other hand, dis-
crimination toward the ticket holder causes circumstances of dis-
tress for which the third party has a cause of action under section
404(b). While the first theory merely follows the Nader analysis,
the latter, relied upon by the court in Mason, expands the statutory
coverage" and stretches traditional tort analysis to reach the result.
The Mason court improperly cited Nader for the proposition
that the victim of an intentional tort or a negligent act is covered
by section 404(b); the third party in Nader" recovered exclusive
of the statute." In Mason it is evident that the third party could not
recover on the basis of tort concepts. Even if the tort elements were
present, however, the applicability of section 404(b) would still
remain since the parties were in court on the basis of a section
tor. While the court does not explicitly state this conclusion, the holding implies
it. 369 F. Supp. at 803.
"' The third party here does not fall into a category of beneficiaries having
rights under the contract. See RESTATEMENT OF CONaACTS §§ 133, 147 (1932).
Nor does the party fall into the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS formula-
tion of intended beneficiaries.
, A line of railroad cases established that passengers must be provided with
information to enable them to safely make their journey. See Hassletine v.
Southern Ry. Co., 75 S.C. 141, 55 S.E. 142 (1906); Appleby v. St. Paul City
Ry. Co., 54 Minn. 169, 55 N.W. 1117 (1893).
7' 13 Av. L. REP. at 17,117 (1974).
76 See cases cited note 12 supra.
17 365 F. Supp. at 132-33.
76 13 Av. L. REP. 17,114, 17,118 (1974).
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404(b) cause of action." Although the court found a "violation
of a right""0 resulting in emotional distress, the court never made it
clear whether this is a federally created right, protected by the
statute, or whether "right" refers to "duty" as required in negli-
gence law. The court in Fitzgerald held that the right to carriage
is a right at law," and Mason represents a negligent breach of this
right resulting in emotional distress actionable under section
404(b) by the foreseeable third party victim. Realizing that re-
covery by one party for injury to another is a tenuous situation,
the court spoke of "breaches and violations of rights" directly to
the third party and finds a cause of action for the "unforeseeable
plaintiff.""2 Therefore, the court expanded not only the coverage of
the statute but also stretches concepts of foreseeability and inten-
tionality to arrive at the result.
The implications of this holding are significant to the carrier and
passenger alike. The consequences of the court's analysis would be
to expand the coverage of federal statutes so as to compensate
peripheral plaintiffs for injury to those clearly within the intended
scope of the statute." Since Fitzgerald, the courts have applied sec-
tion 404(b) to discrimination in any form. Theoretically, to ex-
pand section 404(b) opens up a greatly expanded class of by-
standers. It seems, given the case development,' the legislative
history, and the rules of statutory construction,' that the statute
should only apply to passengers and ticket holders. It makes no
difference whether the third party recovers because the statute
gives him rights against defendant's conduct or because rights are
created for one party and the third party recovers as a foreseeable
beneficiary of the statutory coverage. Simply stated, the statute
here was intended for passengers. Although the cases modified the
originally intended application of 404(b) from use in cases of eco-
7'Id. at 17,117.
'Oid. at 17,118.
s8 229 F.2d at 500. The court cites section 403 of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938 as giving this right.
82 13 Av. L. REP. at 17,118 (1974).
3 Research into the Civil Rights Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in particular, re-
veals no such expansion of statutory coverage to third parties which enables them
to recover for the breach of another's right.
84 See cases cited note 12 supra.
12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 286 (1965). See also Reitmeister
v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1974).
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nomic discrimination to use in any discriminatory situation, the
group covered by the statute has remained unchanged. This fact
alone does not demand that traditional coverage remain the same,
but considering the original intent and the difficulty of protecting
the new class, the restricted application is proper.
Pragmatically, this expansion of liability raises difficulties for the
airlines in terms of insuring and protecting against the unforesee-
able plaintiff. If the basis of the tort law is fault, it is difficult to
see where the airline was guilty with respect to the third party in
Mason. It is evident that Nader is inapplicable to the Mason situa-
tion. Simply stated, the third party in Nader was the victim of
tortious conduct. Here, however, that was not the case. The
anomaly of the situation is realized when the relationship of sec-
tion 404(b) to the denied boarding compensation sections of the
Federal Aviation Regulations are considered." As an alternative to
pursuing a section 404(b) cause of action, a plaintiff passenger
may accept compensation. It would seem that the class covered by
section 404(b) should be the same class as is covered by the denied
boarding compensation statute. Such a conclusion, however, does
not follow. Mrs. Mason, who is not covered by section 404(b),
would not have been entitled to compensation under the statute.
Congressional guidance, therefore, on the proper coverage of sec-
tion 404(b) is both necessary and desirable.
Difficulty in allowing third party recovery based solely on the
statute caused the court to rely on tort concepts in allowing the
plaintiff to recover. Since the Nader third party recovery was not
based on section 404(b), reliance on Nader is incorrect. If the
third party recovery in Nader is upheld on appeal, the third party
award in Mason may be saved by its reliance on "foreseeability"
language drawn from Nader," notwithstanding the fact that Mrs.
Mason is in court on the basis of a section 404(b) cause of action.
The tenuousness of a section 404(b) third party recovery is indi-
cated by the court's need to hang the decision on the established tort
concepts. In fact, however, the third party could not recover on the
basis of tort concepts alone. The court engages not only in a ques-
tionable expansion of statutory coverage, but a questionable appli-
88 Part 250 of the FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS provides rules for com-
pensation if boarding is denied. 14 C.F.R. §5 250.1-250.10 (1974).
87 13 Av. L. REP. at 17, 118 (1974).
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cation of tort law as well. The resulting proposition that a third
party non-passenger may recover under a statute traditionally ap-
plied only to passengers will be a difficult one for the court to
accept on appeal.
James M. Lober
CONFLICT OF LAWS-SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP-In Ok-
lahoma, When the Facts of a Suit for Personal Injuries Sustained as
a Result of an Aircrash Occur in more than one State or Nation,
the Local Law of the State which has the Most Significant Relation-
ship to the Occurrence and to the Parties Determines the Substan-
tive Rights of the Parties Involved. Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d
632 (Okla. 1974).
Dr. Theodore Brickner, a resident of Oklahoma, crashed his
small Oklahoma registered and hangared aircraft and his three Ok-
lahoma passengers into the soil of Mexico, creating a conflict of
laws problem.1 As a result of injuries sustained by the passengers,
three separate actions based on negligence were brought and later
consolidated for trial in the Oklahoma District Court, Tulsa Coun-
ty. All negligence on the part of Dr. Brickner was alleged to have
occurred in Mexico;' thus, since Mexico was the place of wrong,
application of the lex loci delicti rule would require the use of the
law of Mexico to determine the liabilities and substantive rights
of the parties. In an interlocutory order, the district judge ruled
that lex loci delicti had been replaced in Oklahoma by the signifi-
cant relationship doctrine. Upon motion of the defendant doctor,
the order was certified for review by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The question read:
In tort actions, is the law of the place wherein the cause of action
arose controlling on the substantive rights of the parties, or does
1 R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 3 (1968). Any case whose facts occur
in more than one state or nation, or any case whose facts occur in one jurisdiction
but the suit is brought in another, is a conflict-of-laws case when it is necessary
to choose between the relevant laws of the differing jurisdictions.
2 Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632, 634 (Okla. 1974).
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the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship
with the occurrence and with the parties determine the substantive
rights and liabilities of the partiesT
Held, affirmed: In Oklahoma, when the facts of a suit for personal
injuries sustained as a result of an aircrash occur in more than one
state or nation, the local law of the state which has the most sig-
nificant relationship to the occurrence and to the parties determines
the substantive rights of the parties involved. Brickner v. Gooden,
525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974).
The decision to change the conflict of laws rule from the old lex
loci delicti rule to the more modem significant relationship doc-
trine should not have surprised Oklahoma practitioners. In 1973,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court had almost renounced the old rule
but felt restrained by stare decisis.' The two companion cases be-
fore the court at that time, Richey v. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc.
and Wood v. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc.,' had arisen out of the
same aircrash as a case decided in 1965 under the old rule.' The
Oklahoma Supreme Court felt that the three cases were so intrin-
sically connected as to require a stare decisis ruling on the conflict
of laws issue." Even so, in a special concurring opinion four justices
of the court advocated overruling the lex loci delicti standard pros-
pectively, and replacing it with the significant relationship test as
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.'
In Brickner, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court went further
than the foreseeable affirmation of the lower court's interlocutory
order. Without determining whether a conflict existed or returning
to the lower court the question of which law should apply, the court
decided that Oklahoma, not Mexico, had the most significant rela-
tionship to the suit." This makes the case notable to litigators of
8Id.
4 Richey v. Cherokee Labs., Inc., 515 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1973).
5Id.
6 Cherokee Labs., Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965).
7 515 P.2d at 1379 (concurring opinion).
'Id.
9 Brickner v. Gooden, 525 P.2d 632, 634-35 (Okla. 1974). Pursuant to a re-
quest by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the parties had stipulated:
All parties herein agree that in the event this Court holds that the
law of lex loci delicti no longer obtains in Oklahoma but that the
trial courts are to invoke the significant relationship doctrine as de-
fined by the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, such determination
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aircrash suits"0 since Brickner provides not only an example of the
switch to the significant relationship doctrine, but also, an interpre-
tation of that doctrine. Unfortunately, the interpretation by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court shows a misunderstanding of the method
and purpose behind the newer theory. Study of this misunder-
standing is important to future decisions and to a better under-
standing of the conflict of laws problems in aircrash litigation.
That the Oklahoma court could misapply the significant relation-
ship doctrine is a possible result of widespread confusion in this
area of tort law. As a result of numerous legal battles, a national
rhubarb over the method that a forum court should use to deter-
mine the law to apply when the facts of a case occur in more than
the forum state" has divided the American legal community into
two camps."2 One camp supports the older lex loci delicti theory;
the other camp supports the old rule's antithesis, the significant
relationship doctrine.
The lex loci delicti rule for conflict of laws questions in cases
sounding in tort is easily traceable to Joseph Beale's 1916 work,
A Treatise on the Conflicts of Laws or Private International Law.
should be made by the trial court with the applicable guide lines
and rules laid down by this Court.
Letter from the Parties to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, April 26, 1974.
10 Since air accidents often occur such that they involve interstate travelers
and because the suit for damages may then be brought in any of the jurisdictions
that the parties reside in, the conflict of laws area is of significance when choosing
the forum to bring the action. Further, federal courts sitting in Oklahoma must
apply Oklahoma conflict-of-law rules. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.,
313 U.S. 487 (1941) applying Erie R. Co. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Explanatory Note § 1,
comment c at 2 (1971).
Broadly speaking, three views are possible in dealing with cases
involving foreign elements. First, the court might refuse to hear all
such cases. Second, the court might decide them all by its own local
law. Lastly, special rules might be devised to deal with such cases
in a manner designed to promote the smooth functioning of the
international and interstate systems and to do justice to the parties.
Id.
The argument has always been over the special rules devised to accomplish
this last method.
1"The leading major works in the area are: D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw
PROCESS (1965); B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963);
A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962); R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (1968); A. VON MEHRER & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW
OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1971). The dispute was continued in 1974 by over 15 law review
articles.
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Beale, while he was the American Law Institute's Reporter on con-
flict of laws, incorporated his views into the first Restatement of
Conflict of Laws.'" Beale's theory was to determine in advance the
most important factor in a transaction. This factor would subse-
quently identify the place whose law should apply." In a case in-
volving a tort, all substantive questions were to be governed by
the local law of the place of the wrong." For example, the original
Restatement announced that the place of wrong was "the state
where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an
alleged tort takes place."'" In most cases this would mean that the
law of the state in which the injury occurred, the lex loci delicti,
would control the substantive questions raised by aircrashes or
other accidents involving passengers from varied states."'
Criticism of Beale's theories began early,"8 but the problem of
suggesting an alternate system or rule really began only when the
automobile and the airplane made the old rule's mechanistic ap-
proach seem unjust. A more mobile society created many more
conflict situations-situations where the state of the last event bore
only a slight relationship to the occurrence and the parties with re-
spect to a particular issue." This modern situation became especial-
ly burdensome when courts were required by the lex loci doctrine
to apply the law of a different state when the conflict was caused
fortuitously. In Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.," the Court of
"3 Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 267 (1966).
14LEFLAR, supra note 1 at 205-06 (1968).
5Section 142 of the original Restatement announced:
The measure of damages for a tort is determined by the law of the
place of wrong.
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1934).
"Id. § 377.
'TRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note, 5
145-74 at 412 (1971).
"1 Leflar, supra note 13 at 268, citing two works of Beale's early critics: FAL-
CONBRIDGE, ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947) and LORENZEN, SELECTED
ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947).
"9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 17 at 413; First
Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973).
2Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1960).
Modem conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the
traveling citizen of this State to the varying laws of other States
through and over which they move .... An air traveler from New
York may in a flight of a few hours' duration pass through several
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Appeals of New York began the judicial formulation of an alterna-
tive to the Bealean position. The majority opinion stated that even
though the administrator of the estate of a deceased passenger
could recover for negligence under Massachusetts law, New York
public policy would prevent the New York courts from applying the
damage limitation in that same statute.' Such a dodge around the
old rule is transparent, since each time the laws of the forum state
and the state where the wrong took place conflict, the public policy
of the forum state, as represented by the legislative act, will also
conflict. The New York Court was, however, attempting to circum-
vent the old rule, but had not yet developed a new vocabulary to
deal with the problem.
In 1963, Babcock v. Jackson"' established a new vocabulary and
assured New York judicial leadership in developing an alternative
to the Bealean doctrine. Babcock created the significant relation-
ship doctrine which requires the forum court to examine the laws
that are in conflict, using prescribed standards, to determine which
law has the most significant relationship to the issue. This new
theory was incorporated by the authors of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws in the tort area, and two new sections
were created to cure the mechanistic problems of the old doctrine.
Sections 6 and 145 are the direct result of the New York attempt
to achieve more flexibility in the choice of law field.' Finally, the
of those commonwealths. His plane may meet with disaster in a
State he never intended to cross but into which the plane has flown
because of bad weather or other unexpected developments, or an
airplane's catastrophic descent may begin in one State and end in
another. The place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous.
id. at 527.
21 Id.
22 9 N.Y.2d at -, 172 N.E.2d at 528.
23 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 6 & 145 (1971). 6
reads:
Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue,
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New York Court, in Dym v. Gordon,' established a correct meth-
odology or procedure to use in applying the Babcock rule. Accord-
ing to the Dym opinion, after determining the particular issue in-
volved and that the jurisdictions' laws do conflict, the court should
identify the policies behind the laws in conflict and examine the
contacts of the respective jurisdictions "to ascertain which has the
superior connection with the occurrence and thus would have a
superior interest in having its policy or law applied."' By 1966, the
New York court had brought to fruition the academicians' hoped-
for alternative, creating a complex and complete system to act as
the antithesis of the old method of choosing the law that the
forum should apply in tort conflict of laws problems."
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in determination and application of the law to be
applied.
S 145 reads:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
in tort are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship
to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in
section 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principle of
section 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the par-
ties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.
16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965). In this case, two New York domi-
ciliaries temporarily residing in Colorado were involved in a car accident. The
accident took place in Colorado, a state where the guest statute would bar re-
covery. The New York Court applied Colorado law and announced that the re-
lationship of the parties to each other was formed in Colorado. Some critics have
said that Dym is in conflict with Babcock citing the fact that the majority in
Babcock is the dissent in Dym, however, the dissent is really over the outcome
of the case and not with the method used to reach the decision.
28 16 N.Y.2d at -, 209 N.E.2d at 794. The majority wrote:
[Ilt is necessary first to isolate the issue, next to identify the policies
embraced in the laws in conflict, and finally to examine the contacts
of the respective jurisdictions to ascertain which has a superior con-
nection with the occurrence and thus would have a superior interest
in having its policy or law applied.
11RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introductory Note,
145-74 at 413 '(1971). Of course New York was not isolated in its attacks on
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The final incorporation in 1968 of the significant relationship
doctrine into the Restatement (Second) did not signal the ultimate
victory of the new doctrine; that it did not do so was a result of
the variety of reactions and responses of other jurisdictions to the
new idea, most of which may be classified as judicial retrench-
ment.' Texas decided that, without legislative action, its courts
cannot extend their judicial powers beyond the state borders."
Stare decisis has, as in the Oklahoma cases of Richey and Wood,
paralyzed some courts,"° while Connecticut has steadfastly main-
tained that there is no reason to change from the old doctrine. 1 But
the major criticism of the significant relationship theory has been
that it is uncertain." Lex loci delicti may appear arbitrary and un-
the old theory. The following cases, in chronological order, are representative of
the development of the antithesis:
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1960);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 73, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Griffith v. United
Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120,
209 N.E.2d 792 (1965); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966);
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968).
The enthusiasm for the new rule can best be seen in the words of the last
two decisions cited above. In Clark, the New Hampshire Supreme Court wrote,
That old rule [lex loci delicti] is today almost completely discredited
as an unvarying guide to choice of law decisions in all tort cases.
... No conflict of laws authority in America today agrees that the
old rule should be retained. . . . No American court which has
felt free to re-examine the matter thoroughly in the last decade has
chosen to retain the old rule .... It is true that some courts, even
in recent decisions, have retained it .... But their failure to reject
it has resulted from an unwillingness to abandon established prece-
dent . . . not to any belief that the old rule was a good one.
107 N.H. at -, 222 A.2d at 206.
In Schwartz, the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded:
This movement away from lex loci culminated in 1968 in its rejec-
tion by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. While the
majority of jurisdictions have yet to repudiate the lex loci delicti
rule, we feel that the recent, better-reasoned decisions evidence the
trend away from its application.
103 Ariz. at -, 447 P.2d at 255.
29 F. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 37-49 (1971).
219 Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968). See generally
WEINTRAUB, supra note 28 at 37-39; Note, Wrongful Death-Conflict of Laws-
Significant Contacts vs. Loci, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 309 (1968); Note, The
Doctrine of Most Significant Contacts in Texas: Marmon v. Mustang Aviation,
Inc., 22 Sw. L. J. 863 (1969). For a parallel decision see McGinty v. Ballentine
Produce, Inc., 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966).
30 See notes 4, 5, 7, 8 supra.
31St. Pierre v. St. Pierre, 158 Conn. 620, 262 A.2d 185 (1969); Landers v.
Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966).
"Folk v. York-Shipley, Inc., 239 A.2d 236 (Del. 1968); Friday v. Smoot,
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fair sometimes, but the certainty with which it may be applied is,
according to these critics of the new method, not to be discarded
so lightly. 3 In 1972, three states' upper courts, after examining
the effects of the new doctrine, came to the conclusion that too
often the outcome of one case is in conflict with an earlier decision
even though the facts are similar.' Two of the courts, the Supreme
courts of South Dakota and Tennessee, adopted a "wait and see"
attitude, prefering to retain the traditional place of wrong rule
until the new doctrine could match the old virtues of certainty,
simplicity, and ease of application.' The third court, possibly the
most influential, was the New York Court of Appeals. In Neumeier
v. Kuehner,"8 Justice Fuld, the author of the Babcock decision,
surveyed with candor the historical development of the significant
relationship doctrine since that decision and determined that it was
frequently difficult to discover the purposes of policies underlying
the relevant local law rules of the state laws in conflict and that it
was even more difficult-assuming these policies could be found-
to determine on a principled basis which was more important.'
211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So.2d 743,
rev'd on rehearing 201 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1967); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223
A.2d 763 (1966); Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
3 Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); White v. King, 244 Md. 348,
223 A.2d 763 (1966). The Delaware court in Friday declared:
It may well be that the rule of lex loci delicti in some instances may
appear arbitrary and unfair, but at the same time it has one positive
asset. It is certain. The same cannot be said of the rule of more sig-
nificant relationship for, as the majority opinion in Griffith v. United
Air Lines, Inc. states, it is "the beginning .. .of a workable, fair
and flexible approach to choice of law which will become more
certain as it is tested and further refined when applied to specific
cases before our courts."
We think we may not depart by judicial fiat from a rule settled
in this state to adopt a "flexible approach" which must be made
certain by future litigation.
211 A.2d at 597.
In White, the Maryland court was of a like mind:
[C]ertainty in the law is not so common that, where it exists, it is
to be lightly descarded.
244 Md. at -, 223 A.2d at 765.
1 Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972); Heidemann
v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164 (1972); Winters v. Maxey, 481 S.W.2d
755 (Tenn. 1972).
'Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 255, 194 N.W.2d 164, 169 (1972).
"Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
Ir ld. at -, id. at 457.
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The New York court decided that the securing of predictability and
uniformity was of immediate import, and that possibly Babcock
allowed too much judicial discretion."
The effect of this retrenchment has been to slow the rush to join
the new camp. The impact of the South Dakota and Tennessee
cases on the fledgling significant relationship doctrine is difficult to
gauge, but the withdrawal of the New York court from its position
in the vanguard supporting its adoption has had an immediate
effect.' In First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek,' the Colorado Supreme
Court, opposing the lex loci delicti rule, adopted a narrower and
more limited rule than the broad significant relationship doctrine
by deciding to follow New York's recent moderate approach.
First Nat'l Bank and Neumeier may represent an attempt to syn-
thesize the two doctrines, but the major result has been to halt
growth of either camp and thus, until Brickner, to freeze the great
debate.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Brickner ignored the new New
York stance, although it did cite the Colorado decision,"' and adopt-
ed the Restatement (Second) without reservation.' Listing what it
felt were the three major reasons given by other courts for rejecting
the significant relationship doctrine as (i) no compelling reason for
the change, (ii) that uncertainty would result, and (iii) that the
new rule could not be uniformly applied, ' the Oklahoma Supreme
Court countered all of these objections by quoting from the 1967
decision in Riech v. Purcell:"
Ease of determining applicable law and uniformity of rules of de-
cision, however, must be subordinated to the objective of proper
choice of law in conflict cases, i.e., to determine the law that most
appropriately applies to the issue involved.... '
The Brickner decision is an affirmation of the need for broad judi-
3Id.
See Symposium-Neumeier v. Kuehner: A Conflicts Conflict, 1 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 98 (1973).
40514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973).
4' Curiously, the Oklahoma court did not cite the Babcock decision in either
Richey or Brickner; possibly to avoid the recent Neumeier corrollary.
41525 P.2d at 637.
43 Id.
67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727 (1967).
I ld. at -, Id. at 730, quoted at 636 of 525 P.2d.
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cial discretion as required by the Babcock rule.' But this adoption
of the Restatement (Second), when placed in perspective, may
simply be the last hurrah of the significant relationship doctrine
rather than the trumpeting of a second wave of pro-Restatement
(Second) decisions. A good prognosis may be made after examin-
ing the method utilized by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in apply-
ing the significant relationship theory.
To follow the Dym procedure" the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in Brickner, after determining each point at which the Mexican and
Oklahoma laws were in conflict, should have examined the policies
behind the conflicting laws. The Court then should have carefully
determined which contacts with the jurisdictions by the parties or
the occurrence would create a superior interest of one jurisdiction
in seeing that as to that particular issue, its policies were carried
out. Unfortunately, the Oklahoma court reversed the procedure
and baldly announced:
Although the Republic of Mexico would be concerned with the
conduct of parties while they were within its borders and the acci-
dent occurred in Mexico, Oklahoma has the most significant rela-
tionship to the occurrence and the parties."
Such a naked assertion destroyed the advantage of the significant re-
lationship theory because it failed to recognize the doctrinal purpose
to weigh the policies behind the laws to get the best law for each
issue presented. This misapplication of theory overshadows the
effect of the Oklahoma court's zealous acceptance of the significant
relationship doctrine.
The principal problem is that the Oklahoma court never identi-
fied the laws in conflict, never identified the issues before the lower
court, and therefore could not begin to weigh the policies behind
those laws. Had the laws of Oklahoma and Mexico not been in con-
flict then no real issue would have existed; yet, the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court never determined what the issues involved in the case
were nor what laws might have been in conflict. The facts in Brick-
ner suggest possible conflicts over the standard of care required of a
pilot or the possible statutory prohibition of a husband-wife suit,
" See note 41 supra.
47 See notes 25, 26 supra.
4 525 P.2d at 638.
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but these are mere second-guesses since the court never isolated any
issue on which to base its decision.
By determining the state first and then looking to that state's law,
the Oklahoma court utilized the same procedure as that of the lex
loci delitci proponents. 9 As a result, Brickner would appear to re-
quire only a "toting up" of contacts,"° as in the application of a
long-arm statute, to determine which state has the most interest
in the occurrence. The Oklahoma Supreme Court lumped all possi-
ble contacts together, and without identifying which contacts re-
lated to particular issues, weighed the two conflicting groups. No
relationship was shown between particular contacts and state poli-
cies; as a result, the fact that the plane was hangared in Oklahoma
was balanced against the fact that all alleged negligence was stipu-
lated to have happened in Mexico. Since the approach of the Re-
statement (Second) is to choose between the rules of law by ex-
amining the policies behind those laws, the weighing of the domicile
of the parties, which might be significant if the conflict arose over
the relationship of the parties, against where the accident happened,
which might belong to an entirely different issue, completely under-
mines the concept of "most significant relationship." The numeric-
al superiority of one state's or nation's contacts with the parties
should not be the decisive factor in determining which law will
govern."
Finally, the Oklahoma court determined that since the crash was
fortuitous, the courts of Mexico would have no real interest in the
parties. Such an argument, that only Oklahoma law shows an inter-
est in Oklahoma citizens, might have been made in the courts of
the Roman or British empires, but it shows little reflection on the
fact that almost all aircrashes are fortuitous while the laws govern-
ing the liabilities caused by such crashes are not. The trip through
Mexican airspace was intentionally taken and the laws controlling
that airspace were written with just such activities in mind. If Mexi-
49 LEFLAR, supra note 1 at 237, where the vested rights approach or the
Bealean method, is shown to call for a choice between states, not between laws;
exactly what the Oklahoma court has done in Brickner.
10Id. at 217, citing D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS 9, 79 (1965),
and Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problems, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173,
178, 192 (1933). Compare Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson; A Recent
Development in Con:ict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233 (1963) with LEFLAR,
supra note 1 at 221.
" See note 50 supra.
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co is concerned about aircraft flown by aliens, it should make no
difference to the court that those aliens reside in Oklahoma when
determining whether the policy behind such a law is directly related
to an accident. After examining the Oklahoma opinion, Mexico
might decide that the significant relationship doctrine is no more
than a method of circumventing the lex loci delicti rule so that de-
cisions may be made with familiar law."
The Oklahoma court's failure to follow the Dym procedure, fail-
ure to determine the issues between the parties, failure to examine
the policies behind the Mexican law or even to examine that law,
and failure to apply the Restatement (Second) Section 145 proper-
ly in weighing the contacts with the two jurisdictions, will preclude
any large following of the Brickner decision. Brickner v. Gooden
was wrongly decided because of an attempt to oversimplify an
entire area of intricate law.
Guyle E. Cavin
TARIFFS-NORTH ATLANTIC CARGO RATEs-The Prescription
of Transatlantic Cargo Rates Based Upon Mileage From European
Points to United States Gateway Airports Rather Than a Common
Rate Formula Did Not Exceed the Statutory Powers of the CAB.
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 498 F.2d
129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 623
(1974).
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) initiated an investigation'
in response to a complaint by the City of Baltimore that the North
Atlantic cargo rate structure, recommended by the International
Air Transport Association (IATA) and approved by the CAB,'
52 As the Supreme Court of the United States wrote in Lauritzen v. Larsen,
345 U.S. 571, at 582 (1953):
[I]n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful
of the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be
avoided.
'CAB Order No. 69-3-47 (March 13, 1969). The scope of the proceeding
was expanded by CAB Order No. 69-4-139 (Apr. 30, 1969) and CAB Order
No. 69-10-111 (Oct. 23, 1969).
'CAB Order No. 69-10-30 (Oct. 7, 1969).
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violated section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.' The
complaint alleged that cargo rates for United States gateway cities
other than New York, computed by adding the domestic rate be-
tween the gateway city and New York to the Europe/New York
base rate, were unduly preferential to New York and unduly pre-
judicial to competing gateways. The administrative law judge found
the allegations in the petition valid and ruled the rate structure ad-
verse to the public interest Upon review, the CAB accepted the
findings of the administrative law judge, but rejected his recom-
mendation that a common rate' be prescribed for all gateway
points and ordered instead that new transatlantic cargo rates be
calculated by multiplying the distance between the United States
gateway city and the European point by the New York/Europe
rate per mile.'
The Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland' pe-
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970) pro-
vides:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause
any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any par-
ticular person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air trans-
portation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular per-
son, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to
any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
4 A gateway city has direct service to Europe.
5Initial Decision of Administrative Law Judge William F. Cusick, Agree-
ments Adopted by IATA Relating to North Atlantic Cargo Rates, CAB Docket
No. 20522 (served Feb. 8, 1972). [hereinafter cited as Initial Decision]
6Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 412(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (1970) pro-
vides in p~rtinent part:
The Board shall by order disapprove any . . . contract or agree-
ment, whether or not previously approved by it, that it finds to
be adverse to the public interest, or in violation of this Act, and
shall by order approve any such contract or agreement . . . that
it does not find to be adverse to the public interest, or in violation
of this Act.
7 A common rate or fare is an equal charge to two points that are at different
distances from a point of origin. Hilo-Mainland Temporary Service Investigation,
Order E-25253 (June 6, 1967).
'Agreement Adopted by IATA Relating to North Atlantic Cargo Rates,
CAB Order No. 73-2-24 (Feb. 6, 1973), aff'd on rehearing, CAB Order No.
73-7-9 (July 5, 1973).
9 The Department of Transportation of the State of Maryland v. CAB and
Virginia v. CAB were consolidated on appeal. The City of Philadelphia, Metro-
politan Washington Board of Trade, Pan American World Airways, Inc., Trans
World Airlines, Inc., Chicago and Detroit Interests, Massachusetts Port Author-
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titioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
for review of the Board's order, averring two issues: (i) that the
CAB is required as a matter of law to establish a common rate for
all American gateway cities, and (ii), that the Board's distance
scheme continues the previously existing preference and prejudice.'"
Held, affirmed: The prescription of transatlantic cargo rates based
upon mileage from European points to United States gateway air-
ports rather than a common rate formula did not exceed the statu-
tory authority of the CAB. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Civil
Aeronautics Board, 498 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
- U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 623 (1974).
In reaching its decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit recognized the broad discretion of the CAB to
fashion remedies for rate discrimination.1 The exercise of this dis-
cretion will not be set aside absent proof that the CAB order lacks
evidentiary support, exceeds a statutory or constitutional limit, or
constitutes an abuse of discretion." The court of appeals in Virginia
v. CAB found substantial evidence for the Board's order because
distance reflects most costs in air transportation and differences in
distance justify rate differentials. The petitioners' contention that
the CAB is bound by decisional precedents of the Interstate Com-
merce Act concerning preference and prejudice" was dismissed be-
cause substantial differences in cost ratios between railroads and
airlines warrant separate regulatory approaches. The prescription of
rates reflecting distance in nearly all domestic and most internation-
al fares and rates provided ample precedent for the Board's selec-
tion of a mileage standard. The Fourth Circuit further noted that
the CAB would exceed its statutory authority under section 1002
ity, Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce and The Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey were permitted to intervene.
10498 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1974).
" The CAB has primary jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of air-
line rates and fares. Price v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 481 F.2d 844 (9th Cir.
1973); Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Hycel, Inc.
v. American Airlines, 328 F. Supp. 190, 193 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Tishman & Lipp,
Inc. v. Delta Airlines, 275 F. Supp. 471, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aft'd, 413
F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969). See generally Coultas, The Doctrine of Primary Juris-
diction: Determination of Express and Implied Immunity From the Antitrust
Laws, 39 J. AIR L. & CoM. 559 (1973).
" Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573, 592 (1949); Board
of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 546 (1942).
lInterstate Commerce Act, 3(1), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1970).
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(e) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958' (the Act) when deter-
mining remedial rates if the Board created a novel undue preference
and discrimination. The Board, therefore, properly refused to es-
tablish common rates which deprive cities nearest to Europe of
their geographical advantages. Moreover, the economic impact of
common rates could raise freight costs. Finally, the petitioners'
second claim that the new CAB rates did not remove the prejudice
to American gateways other than New York caused by equal faring
was rejected because the rate per mile for each transatlantic flight
is the same, and European common faring is beyond the regulation
and control of the CAB. 15
The CAB has no direct statutory authority to establish the level
of international air fares and rates; the Board may only review tar-
iffs filed by air carriers.'" Rather, the International Air Transporta-
tion Association, a trade organization of domestic and foreign
airlines, determines rates by the unanimous agreement of its mem-
bers present at periodic traffic conferences."' I ATA resolutions
are subsequently subject to ratification by parent nations of the
member carriers. In the United States, all rate agreements must
be filed with the CAB thirty days in advance of their implementa-
tion and kept open for public inspection." If the procedural re-
quirements of section 403" of the Federal Aviation Act are satis-
fied and no objections are filed, the tariff becomes effective in ac-
cordance with its terms. A substantive challenge that the rate is un-
reasonable, discriminatory, or unduly preferential and prejudicial,
however, may be made by the Board or an interested third party
"
4 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(e), 49 U.S.C. § 14 82(e) (1970).
15 498 F.2d 129, 136 (4th Cir. 1974).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §5 404, 801, 1002(j), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1374,
1461, 1482(j) (1970).
1
7 See National Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 436 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
R. CHUANG, THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (1972); Note,
CAB Approval of IATA Rate Agreements: The Evolution of the Standard of
Public Interest Under Section 412 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 38 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 275 (1972); 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 281 (1972); Gazdik,
Rate-Making and the IATA Traffic Conference, 16 J. AIR L. & COM. 298 (1949).
The exercise of the unanimity rule by foreign carriers who oppose dilution of
their revenues has frustrated efforts to apply the principle of common rates to
the North Atlantic route. CAB Order No. 73-2-24 at 13 (Feb. 6, 1973).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 403(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970); 14
C.F.R. S 221.160 (1972).
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403, 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1970).
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at any time." Upon a prima facie showing of discrimination, the
Board must either justify the discrimination and demonstrate a pub-
lic policy reason for not investigating or conduct an inquiry." Pend-
ing an investigation, the CAB has the discretion either to suspend
the rates or permit their continuation.'
The Act imposes a duty on every air carrier to establish just and
reasonable rates and fares.' Under section 404(b) of the Act, no
airline may unjustly discriminate, prejudice, or disadvantage in any
respect any particular person, port, or locality in air transporta-
tion. ' This prohibition against discrimination is a rule of reason
and the legality of a tariff is a question of fact, not of law.' The
provision against undue preference and prejudice to a port or lo-
cality seeks to avoid unreasonable economic discrimination. A pref-
erence or prejudice may be based either upon distance or location
and may refer to the charging of the same fare for a different dis-
tance or different fares for the same distance without economic
justification." A preference, prejudice, or advantage, nevertheless,
is lawful if not undue or unreasonable." A prima facie demonstra-
tion of undue preference and prejudice in a rate structure requires
evidence of four elements: (i) prejudice to one party and prefer-
ence to another in the movement of traffic; (ii) a competitive rela-
tionship between the parties; (iii) the "undue" character of the
10 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 1002(d), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1970).
11Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926, 932 (1st Cir.
1969).
12Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(g), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1970);
Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968); Note, Summary Power of the Civil Aeronautics
Board to Suspend Proposed Airline Rates, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 267 (1973).
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 5 403(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
4Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970).
25 Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968); Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S.
534, 546 (1942) held "Whether a preference or advantage . . . is undue . . .
is one of those questions of fact that have been confided by Congress to the
judgment and discretion of the Commission. See also Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd.
v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 304 (1937).
6 Frontier Excursion Fares Case, 42 C.A.B. 440, 445 (1965); American Air-
lines Off-Coach Service, 28 C.A.B. 25, 26 (1958). See generally Rosenfield, Fac-
tors in Determination of the Validity of Domestic Airline Fares, 37 Mo. L. REV.
246 (1972).
" Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 162 U.S. 197, 219
(1896). A rate may be reasonable and nonetheless create undue preference or
prejudice to a locality. New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 344-45 (1947).
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preference and prejudice; and (iv) economic injury to the preju-
diced party.' If the CAB finds an existing rate unduly preferential
or prejudicial, the Board may adjust the rate under section 1002(f)
of the Act" to the extent necessary to correct the discrimination. In
modifying a rate structure, the CAB is required by statute to con-
sider several criteria, including the effect of the new rates upon the
movement of traffic and upon carrier revenues, the character and
quality of service, the advantage of air transportation, and the pub-
lic interest in an adequate and efficient transportation system."
The CAB in North Atlantic Cargo Rates" found preference and
prejudice in the preexisting rate structure formulated at the 1969
IATA Traffic Conference at Athens, Greece. The IATA resolutions
determined rates for the United States gateway cities other than
New York by the use of "arbitraries" or "add-ons."" The rate was
calculated by adding the "arbitrary" to the New York/London base
whether or not the flight actually stopped in New York. This
scheme effected a generally lower rate per mile for shipments to and
from New York than the equivalent rate per mile for shipments to
and from other cities for almost every specific commodity rate.3
The public interest was also adversely affected. A substantial vol-
ume of North Atlantic cargo moved by truck between New York
and other gateway cities for reasons of price expediency in contra-
vention of section 102 of the Act which provides that a goal of eco-
nomic regulation is the promotion of air transportation. ' Conse-
28 CAB Order No. 73-2-24 at 5-6 (Feb. 6, 1973); Cf. Freas, Ratemaking
Power of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 54,
72-76 (1962).
29 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(f) (1970).
10 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1970).
11 CAB Order No. 73-2-24 (Feb. 6, 1973).
'2 The arbitrary is "determined by finding the lowest possible combination of
rates from the U.S. point to London, including possible trans-border rates through
Montreal, and then subtracting the New York/London rate from the total."
CAB Order No. 73-2-24 at 5 (Feb. 6, 1973). This arbitrary is added to the base
rate to determine the cargo rate for a gateway other than New York.
" Between sixty-five and eighty-five percent of all transatlantic air freight
moves by specific commodity rates. CAB Order No. 73-2-24, at 8 (Feb. 6, 1973).
General commodity rate differentials were approximately two to six cents per
pound. Initial Decision at 42. The effect of the IATA rates was a "wide variance
between the ratios of through rates and mileage compared to the New York-
London leg." Initial Decision at 35.
4 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1970) de-
fines in the public interest: "The encouragement and development of an air
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quently, eighty percent of all North Atlantic cargo flowed through
New York, encouraging overcrowding, delay, pilferage, and custo-
mer dissatisfaction, while simultaneously depressing the utilization
of other gateway ports below their available and potential capaci-
ties.'
All parties to the appeal before the Fourth Circuit in Virginia v.
CAB assented to these findings, but the petitioners sought to rein-
state the remedial rate structure recommended by the administrative
law judge. The initial decision of the administrative law judge
found that an equal rate per mile would not provide a complete
solution for the discrimination and advised that freight rates be
common-rated for all cities comprising the northeast corridor-in-
cluding New York, Boston, Washington, Baltimore, and Philadel-
phia-to afford these cities the opportunity to compete on an
equal basis." The administrative law judge believed that viable al-
ternative ports would relieve congestion at John F. Kennedy Air-
port in New York and would assure service during temporary pe-
riods when New York is closed by inclement weather." The CAB,
on the other hand, ordered that general commodity rates," specific
commodity rates, " and container rates be based upon the distance
between the European point and the United States gateway port.0
Common transcontinental rates were inaugurated by the rail-
roads to the West Coast at the end of the nineteenth century to
compete with maritime carriers who charged equal fares to various
western ports.' Under the group rate systems of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) common faring became a frequent
transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States.
15 Initial Decision at 43-44, 49-50.
'
6ld. at 57-58.
"7 The CAB has previously found that accelerating the dispersal of commerce
in the Northeast corridor would be in the public interest. Domestic Co-terminal
Points-Europe All-Cargo Service Investigation, CAB Order No. 69-4-140 (March
17, 1969).
3 A general cargo rate is the standard base rate which is applied to general
merchandise. IATA, AGREEING FARES AND RATES 86 (1973).
"6 Specific commodity rates are special low developmental rates which are
applied to carefully defined types of merchandise between two selected points.
IATA, AGREEING FARES AND RATES 88 (1973).
4 CAB Order No. 73-2-24 at 3 (Feb. 6, 1973).
41West Coast Common Fares Case, 15 C.A.B. 90, 92 (1952).
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practice in surface rate-making.' The group rate was established
by treating the various localities within an area as though they were
all situated at a common point. Rates were calculated from a cen-
tral point within the group. Generally, the longer the haul, the larg-
er the size of the group of points would be' because differences
in distances on long hauls produce only a small variation in costs
since the cost per mile declines as the length of the haul increases."
The loss of revenue to the carrier from common fares was conse-
quently small, and the shipper who was nearest the destination point
and deprived of his geographical advantage paid only a slightly
higher rate per mile than the other shippers in the group.
Common fares for air transportation have been reluctantly ap-
proved by the CAB only in the presence of special circumstances45
or to promote international cooperation." Special circumstances are
required because common rates are considered by the CAB to be
unjust and economically unsound. Common rates prefer the ship-
per farthest from the destination who absorbs a lesser proportionate
share of the costs and prejudice the shipper nearest the destination
since he assumes a relatively greater proportion of the costs. The
CAB held in the first Hawaiian Common Fares Case" that common
rates to consecutive points are also ordinarily unsound in principle
because equal rates do not reflect the proposition that costs tend
to increase with distance in air transportation.
Although no uniformity of criteria exists for the factual deter-
mination of special circumstances, the Board has considered the
costs of service, competition among carriers and among localities,
4 See D. LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 189-92 (6th ed. 1966);
R. WESTMEYER, ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION (1952); 3 I. SHARFMAN, THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 656-93 (1936); Group rates are criticized
in Note, Group Rates: A Questionable Feature of the Railroad Rate Structure,
98 U. PA. L. REv. 204 (1949).
41 Grain and Products, Oregon, Idaho, Utah to Pacific Coast, 268 I.C.C. 707,
728-29 (1947).
"1K. HEALY, THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION 209 (1940). The Inter-
state Commerce Commission has ordered common rates for competing points
where the mileage difference was less than twenty-five percent. City of Wilming-
ton v. Alabama Great Southern R.R., 316 I.C.C. 709, 725 (1962).
1 Group Inclusion Tour Basing Fares to Hawaii, CAB Order No. 70-7-60
(July 13, 1970); Hilo-Mainland Temporary Service Investigation, 47 C.A.B. 749
(1967); Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 37 C.A.B. 269 (1962); Pacific North-
west-Alaska Tariff Investigation, Order on Reconsideration, 18 C.A.B. 481 (1954).
4 IATA Transatlantic Cargo Rates, CAB Order No. 73-10-55 (Oct. 15, 1973).4
'Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949).
48 Id.
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and the factors listed in section 1002(e) of the Act.' In 1952, the
Board found special circumstances in the West Coast Common
Fares Case,." The CAB approved an existing common rate structure
because the West Cost economy had developed with this scheme,
and all the communities involved in the proceeding had benefited
by the common rate structure. A few years later the CAB approved
common rates from Anchorage to Seattle and Portland because
Portland's freight traffic was instrumental to the economic and mili-
tary development of Alaska, and the Seattle/Portland area was a
common trade zone.' In 1961, a proposal for equal fares for pas-
sengers travelling along the same route to consecutive points was
rejected by the Board as patently preferential, insufficient to cover
the costs of the new service, and unjustified by competitive fac-
tors."2 The second Hawaiian Common Fares Case"5 in 1962 re-
affirmed the special circumstances test, but the CAB nevertheless
held that it lacked authority to order common fares without evi-
dence of the unlawfulness of the current fare scheme. The hearing
examiner had determined that since the outer Hawaiian islands and
Oahu were economically interdependent, public convenience and
necessity required common rates to reverse the declining economy
and population of the outer Islands.
Virginia v. C.A.B. is the first reported judicial opinion to construe
section 404(b) of the Act" with respect to common rates. This ab-
sence of developed case law caused the petitioners to analogize to
section 3 ( 1 ) of the Interstate Commerce Act' and its judicial inter-
49Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(e) (1970);
Northern Consolidated Airlines, Inc., Proposed Fares, 33 C.A.B. 440, 453 (1961);
IATA Agreement Providing for North Atlantic Passenger Fares, 10 C.A.B. 330
(1949).
50 15 C.A.B. 90 (1952).
51 Northwest-Alaska Tariff Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 903 (1953); Order on
Reconsideration, 18 C.A.B. 481 (1954). The special circumstances of the im-
portance of Portland's traffic and of a common trade area controlled the findings
that Portland is 128 miles farther from Anchorage than is Seattle, and that com-
mon rates would dilute carrier revenues.
5'Northern Consolidated Airlines, Inc., Proposed Fares, 33 C.A.B. 440
(1961).
337 C.A.B. 269 (1962). Common rates were imposed to protect intra-
Hawaiian carriers from financial insolvency. Hilo-Mainland Temporary Service
Investigation, 47 C.A.B. 749 (1947).
5"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970).
5 Interstate Commerce Act, S 3(1), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1959) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provi-
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pretation'on the assumption that construction of legislation by an
administrative agency and the judiciary is presumed to control with
sions of this part to make, give, or cause an undue or unrea-
sonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company,
firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port district, gateway,
transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description
of traffic, in any respect whatsoever; or to subject any particular
person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port
district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any
particular description of traffic to any undue or unreasonable pre-
judice or disadvantage to the traffic of any other carrier of what-
ever description;
U.S. Cor.sT. art. I, § 9 states: "No preference shall be given by any regulation
of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another . . .;
Section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is fashioned upon section
3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Until 1935, section 3(1) prohibited undue
preference and prejudice only against a person, company, firm, corporation,
locality, or description of traffic and did not include the word "port." Interstate
Commerce Act, ch. 104, 5 3(1), 24 Stat. 380 (1887). In 1933, the United States
Supreme Court held that ports were not incorporated in the congressional use
of the word "localities." Texas & Pacific Ry. v. United States, 289 U.S. 627, 638
(1933). Two years later, Congress amended the section to add the words "port,
port district, gateway, transit point." Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 509, § 1, 49
Stat. 607 (1935). This amendment passed into section 404(b) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 through the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52
Stat. 973.
The purpose of the inclusion of the reference to ports was to permit traffic to
flow through a maximum number of gateways and to allow ports to compete
equally for imports and exports. Rate schemes fostering port monopolies were
declared, in effect, unlawful.
H.R. R P. No. 1512, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
The committee considers that it is to the interest of the public that
such commerce be permitted to move freely through as many avail-
able ports as the governing circumstances will permit, and that no
restrictions upon and impediments to the free moving thereof should
be imposed that are not clearly shown to be sound or economically
justified. The recommendation of the committee that this bill be
enacted is intended to afford competing ports a forum in which to
complain of rate adjustments which tend to concentrate the move-
ment of the traffic through one port or a limited number of ports,
and to deprive other ports of an opportunity to handle a part of
such traffic. The committee believes that such a diffusion of the
traffic which moves through the ports will redound to the benefit
of the producer and consumer in the interior by whom in the last
analysis the transportation charges levied both for the transportation
thereof and for the use of the facilities at the ports are ultimately
borne.
"The Supreme Court has affirmed ICC endeavors to equalize competitive
opportunities for localities with common rates in three decisions. In Ayshire
Collieries Corp. v. United States, 355 U.S. 573 (1949), the Commission equalized
rates to create a rate structure that would afford a fair opportunity for shippers
to compete in the purchase, sale, and transportation of coal from Illinois, Indiana,
and Western Kentucky mines to points in northern Illinois and Wisconsin. The
ICC had ordered common rates to remove artificial trade barriers and to pro-
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respect to similar and subsequent legislation on the same matter."
Specifically, the petitioners urged that the strict mileage tests order-
ed by the Board conflicted with congressional policy and judicial
precedents seeking to ensure equality of opportunity among com-
peting ports."
The Fourth Circuit in Virginia v. CAB distinguished decisions
construing the Interstate Commerce Act from actions of the CAB
under the Federal Aviation Act, noting that substantial econom-
ic differences exist between the operations of railroads and air-
lines. 9 In the railway industry, there are low variable costs" and
high fixed costs 1 which produce increasing returns to scale. Hence,
average costs"2 decrease with distance because marginal cost 3 is less
than average cost. For this reason, value-of-service pricing is pre-
mote underdeveloped sections of the country in New York v. United States,
331 U.S. 284 (1947). In Ann Arbor R.R. v. United States, 281 U.S. 658 (1930),
the Supreme Court stated: "The prohibition in 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce
Act of any undue preference of one locality over another always has been
treated as intended to prevent the use of rates as a means of promoting the arti-
ficial development of one locality to the detriment of another."
"Texas Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
" Brief for The Commonwealth of Virginia at 24-36, Virginia v. CAB, 498
F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1974); Accord, The Department of Transportation of the
State of Maryland Brief for Certiorari at 8-12, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974).
59498 F.2d 129, 134 (4th Cir. 1974). The court of appeals cited Chicago &
So. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 108 (1948) and Las
Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, 298 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1962). In Chicago the
Supreme Court found "no reason why the efforts of the Congress to foster and
regulate development of a revolutionary commerce that operates in three dimen-
sions should be judicially circumscribed with analogies taken over from two di-
mensional transit." Chicago & So. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra
at 108. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was concerned that borrowing legal
doctrines developed under the Motor Carrier Act involves "the risk of producing
results inconsistent with the purposes and administrative scheme" of the Federal
Aviation Act. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, supra at 437. Locklin has writ-
ten that the "extent to which the theory of rates, developed with respect to rail-
roads, is applicable to . . . other modes of transport depends upon the extent
to which the same cost conditions exist ..... D. LOCKLIN, ECONOMICS OF
TRANSPORTATION 156 (6th ed. 1966).
"Variable costs vary with output of production. See P. SAMUELSON, Eco-
NOMICS (9th ed. 1973).
61 Fixed costs are costs that do not vary with output of production.
62 The average cost per unit of output is determined by dividing total cost
by the number of units of goods produced.
" Marginal cost is the extra cost incurred by the production of one extra unit
of output and is determined by division of the increase in total costs by the
increase in output.
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ferred over rates formulated on distance."' In the airline industry,
however, costs of service, including those costs directly related to
distance, are more determinative of rates because returns to scale
are relatively constant.' Thus, the Fourth Circuit sustained the
CAB determination that rate precedents under the Interstate Com-
merce Act cannot be indiscriminately applied to aviation rates
since economic characteristics warrant different regulatory pro-
grams for each industry."
The CAB may exercise its powers to fix remedial rates only to
the extent necessary to remove an existing preference and discrim-
ination." Approval of a new rate scheme creating a novel undue
preference or prejudice would exceed the Board's statutory author-
ity. 8 The Virginia court held that common rates produce new pre-
ferences and prejudices among localities. Discrimination is effected
because mileage distances within the concentric zones of a common
rate system are disregarded. Shippers in the nearest ports to the des-
tination such as Boston and New York would pay a higher rate per
mile than shippers at the other gateway cities because the same rate
is charged for unequal distances. Shippers outside of the concen-
tric zone in the Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit area would pay
a proportionately higher rate per mile than the rate charged to
64 CAB Order No. 73-2-24 at 23 (Feb. 6, 1973); e.g., Nueces Co. Navigation
Dist. No. 1 v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 325 I.C.C. 400, 408 (1965).
"CAB Order No. 73-2-24 at 23 (Feb. 6, 1973).
-498 F.2d 129, 134 (4th Cir. 1974). The CAB has stated that "blindly to
adopt rulings under another act without regard to real and substantial differences
between the provisions of the two statutes, the purposes underlying their enact-
ment, and the situations with which the two regulatory agencies may be faced,
would be to fail in the duties entrusted to us." Caribbean Area Case, 9 C.A.B.
534, 549 (1948); See Transatlantic Charter Investigation, 40 C.A.B. 233, 270
n.5 (1964); But compare Certificated Air Carrier Military-Tender Investigation,
28 C.A.B. 902, 919-20 (1959) in which the Board stated:
In administering the provisions of . . . (sections 403 and 404)
of the Civil Aeronautics Act, the Board has consistently given
great weight to the precedents established by the Courts and by
the Interstate Commerce Commission in determining issues relat-
ing to alleged unlawful discriminations or other inequities in airline
rates and fares.
See also United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474
(1932) interpreting the prohibition against undue preference and prejudice in
maritime rates found in The Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 815 (1958).
"
7 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(f), 49 U.S.C. § 1482(f) (1970);
Virginia v. CAB, 489 F.2d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 1974).
68 Id.
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customers in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington."' The statu-
tory prohibitions against undue preference, the court of appeals
declared, were not intended to deprive a favorably located port of
its geographical advantages."0 To support its position, the Fourth
Circuit cited United States v. Illinois Central Railway7 and Ala-
bama Great Southern Railroad v. United States. The two cases are
not comparable, however, because neither is a port case. Their use
by the Virginia court of appeals merely obscures the distinction de-
veloped in rate-making between ports and interior cities which may
justifiy slight prejudice to inland points in favor of equality of op-
portunity for ports. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in
Illinois Central approved equal rates for competing points. Finally,
the reasoning of the court in Virginia ignored the issue that common
rates must be unduly preferential or prejudicial to be unlawful."3 A
city will be prejudiced only to the extent that its business declines
from the diversion of traffic to other terminals.' The administrative
law judge in the earlier Virginia hearings determined that common
rates would not in any measurable manner undermine New York's
position as one of the leading air transport centers in the world."
In fashioning a standard for assessment cargo rates, the Virginia
court stated that the courts may consider the economic impact of a
proposed scheme." If the rates for freight destined for gateways
other than New York were reduced to the level of New York's rates,
there would be a consequent reduction of carrier revenues. The air-
lines would also suffer decreased yields as a result of pro-rating
69 The court of appeals in Virginia cited the example that if Baltimore is
common-rated with New York, Cleveland would pay a rate 12.3% higher than
Baltimore's rates although its air mileage is only 3.2% farther from Europe.
498 F.2d at 135.
70498 F.2d 129, 134 (4th Cir. 1974). This principle originated in an opinion
by Mr. Justice Holmes in which he stated that "the law does not attempt to
equalize fortune, opportunities, or abilities." ICC v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 42,
46 (1911). This maxim is not absolute. See, e.g., note 77 infra.
71263 U.S. 515, 524 (1924).
72 340 U.S. 216 (1951). The court of appeals in Virginia inconsistently cites
to decisions reviewing actions by the Interstate Commerce Commission despite
its own pronouncement that precedents under the Interstate Commerce Act are
not controlling in airline regulation.
73Northern Consolidated Airlines, Inc., Proposed Fares, 33 C.A.B. 440
(1961).
71 Whiterock Quarries, Inc. v. Penn. R.R., 266 I.C.C. 157 (1946).
" Initial Decision at 50.
76 498 F.2d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 1974).
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shipments originating at or destined for gateways other than New
York with domestic carriers. The combined impact of these effects
would inevitably require higher rates unless the total volume of
freight traffic would increase."
Although the decision in the instant case is supported by the
economic proposition that charging the same fare for unequal dis-
tances may be economically unsound under most flight conditions,
the Fourth Circuit did not satisfactorily confront the issue of the
special circumstances test which repudiates the concept that eco-
nomic costs are the controlling determinants in rate-making."' The
court of appeals merely recited that the CAB had approved some
international common rates "because of 'special circumstances' not
present here.""' No reasons were given by the Fourth Circuit nor by
the CAB to distinguish the North Atlantic Cargo Rates order from
prior and subsequent Board orders approving international com-
mon rates. The northeast corridor gateway cities involved in this
proceeding are currently common-rated to and from points in the
" Id. at 135; CAB Order No. 73-2-74 at 21 (Feb. 6, 1974).
71 The special circumstances test is a collorary to the principle in both air and
surface transportation that distance is not a controlling factor in rate-making, but
only one of several factors to be considered. Theodore Mfg. Corp., CAB Order
No. 16343 (Sept. 30, 1965). The refusal by the ICC to approve new equal rates for
northern and southern ports because the location of the southern cities justifies a
different rate was reversed as arbitrary and capricious. Equalization of Rates at
North Atlantic Ports, 311 I.C.C. 689 (1959), rev'd, Boston & Maine R.R. v. United
States, 202 F. Supp. 830, 837 (1962), afl'd by an equally divided court, 373 U.S.
372 (1963), reh. denied, 374 U.S. 859 (1963). These decisions are consistent
with the non-cost oriented purpose of the discrimination provisions in both trans-
portation statutes. Controlling weight has been given to considerations other
than distance which reflect cost to a carrier. Goodman, Recent Trends in Trans-
port Rate Regulation, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1245 (1972); See Brazos River
Harbor Navigation Dist. v. Abilene & So. Ry., 319 I.C.C. 54 (1963), afl'd, At-
chinson, Topeka, Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ill.
1964), afl'd mem., 383 U.S. 269 (1967); Nueces Co. Navigation Dist. No. I v.
Atchinson, Topeka, Santa Fe Ry., 325 I.C.C. 400 (1965), aff'd sub. nom. City
of Galveston v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd mem.,
386 U.S. 269 (1967); Hillsborough Co. Port Authority v. Ahnapee & W. Ry.,
313 I.C.C. 691 (1961), afl'd per curiam sub. nom. Alabama T. & N. P. Co. v.
United States, 207 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. Ala. 1962). This policy has been extended
to the construction of section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act through inter-
pretation of the provision as a protective device primarily for shippers and not
for carriers. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 462, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
But compare the CAB emphasis on pricing of inernational air fares according to
costs and distance. IATA Transatlantic Fares Agreement, CAB Order No. 73-4-64
(Apr. 13, 1973).
79 498 F.2d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 1974).
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Far East, South America, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.80 New York is
common-rated with Washington and Baltimore to and from South
American ports, even though Dulles International Airport is there-
by deprived of its geographical advantage of some two hundred
miles. West Coast ports and ten points in the Far East are charged
equal rates despite the fact, for example, that Los Angeles is 994
miles farther from Seoul, Korea than is Seattle. The CAB itself
acknowledged that "such common rating has been a customary
practice in both surface and air transportation over the years. . .. ""
Virginia and Maryland contended that the mileage rates ordered
by the CAB continued the undue preference for New York and pre-
judice to the other gateway points. The Board's order prescribed
new rates by multiplying the New York/London base rate per mile
by the mileage between the United States gateway city and the Eur-
opean point.8" The petitioners urged that the new rates were higher
for Dulles shippers than for New York shippers for every mileage
category.83 This disparity in the rate per mile is produced by com-
mon rates among European cities for transport to and from the
United States."M The neglect of distances within Europe as rate de-
terminants undermines the efforts of the CAB to fix rates on mile-
age flown and requires Baltimore and Washington shippers to pay
80 Initial Decision at 56; Commonwealth of Virginia Brief at 38-39, 42, Vir-
ginia v. CAB, 498 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1974); In the transatlantic rates under in-
vestigation in this case, New York is common-rated with Montreal even though
there is a mileage differential of 200 miles. Brief for Commonwealth of Virginia
for Certiorari at 7, Virginia v. CAB, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974). (Washington is only
190 miles farther from Europe than New York.) The Board upheld equal rates
to the Far East in CAB Order No. 73-12-77 (Dec. 19, 1973) and South America
in CAB Order No. 74-1-130 (Jan. 25, 1974). Intense competition between De-
troit and Windsor, Canada has forced the CAB to retreat from its order of Feb-
ruary 6, 1973 and equalize Detroit's rates with IATA rates to Windsor. CAB
Order No. 74-7-130 (July 29, 1974).
81 Theodore Mfg. Corp., CAB Order No. 16343 at 3 (Sept. 30, 1965).
82CAB Order No. 73-2-24 (Feb. 6, 1973); Tariffs were approved in CAB
Order No. 73-11-63 (Nov. 14, 1973).
83 Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia at 16-24, Virginia v. CAB, 498
F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1974).
" European common rating affects a general disregard of distances over
Europe for flights to and from the United States. For example, the New York
to Milan, Italy rate for 4,004 miles of transport is $.78 per pound but the Dulles
rate to London for only 3,646 miles of transport is $.79 per pound of cargo.
Virginia v. CAB, 498 F.2d 129, 136 (4th Cir. 1974).
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more than New York customers to transport items similar dis-
tances. '
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared that the
petitioners' argument was a comparison of oranges and apples8"
because the European common rating system is beyond the author-
ity of the Board. Moreover, there was no unreasonable discrimina-
tion or preference because the mileage rate to any particular Euro-
pean point is the same for every United States gateway city.8" The
propriety of this conclusion must be questioned. Although the CAB
lacks the power to prescribe rates in international transportation,
the Board is required as a matter of law to remove undue prefer-
ences or prejudices in foreign rates." The European common rate
system does not purport to control intra-European traffic, but it
does affect international transport to and from the United States.
Furthermore, a higher charge to one shipper than to another for
the same number of miles of transport is discriminatory." Finally,
shippers will as a practical matter continue to prefer the airport
which provides the lowest rates in any corridor with close alterna-
tive cities."
Virginia v. CAB provides a convenient framework to analyze
the effectiveness of judicial review of agency actions. At the core
of the court of appeals' opinion is the doctrine that an administra-
tive agency may exercise a large measure of discretion in the for-
mulation of rates."' The agency may fashion a remedy which is
based upon the expertise of its administrative specialists and which
85 Initial Decision at 46; The CAB conceded that this difference in rates will
be produced by its order. CAB Order No. 73-11-63 at 6 n.8 (Nov. 14, 1973).
Add-on charges at Dulles/Friendship were increased three to five cents per kilo
weight depending upon the particular European destination despite the finding
by the CAB that the old charges were so high as to divert shipments to New
York by truck. Initial Decision at 43, 49 and CAB Order No. 73-2-74 at 6 (Feb.
6, 1974).
86498 F.2d 129, 136 (4th Cir. 1974).
8 7 /d.
88 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 404(b), 1002(j), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1374(b),
1484(j) (1970).
8New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947); Hawaiian Common
Fares Case, 37 C.A.B. 269 (1962).
"°Brief of Intervenor Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade at 21, Vir-
ginia v. CAB, 498 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1974).
" Ayshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 335 U.S. 573, 592 (1949); Board
of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 546 (1942).
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promotes uniformity of regulation. 2 The court must affirm the
agency's application of technical knowledge if the findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence, and if the conclusions are not arbi-
trary, capricious or contrary to law or legislative intent."' This ju-
dicial deference, however, allows inconsistent agency actions. A
prevailing problem of the CAB is its failure to develop and adhere
to consistent policy standards. ' The courts, however, have been
reluctant to accept the view that an administrative agency should
be required by law to treat all comparable cases similarly.' The
CAB has been vested with discretion by statute because of its pre-
sumed expertise in implementing congressional policy towards air
transportation. That discretion is proper only so long as the CAB
continues to balance all of the considerations which Congress speci-
fied in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. The exclusion of a policy
which Congress intended for the Board to consider, or the unreas-
onable weight accorded to one factor, should be regarded as an
abuse of discretion because the agency is no longer operating under
its congressional mandate."
The status of the special circumstances test for common rates is
uncertain in the wake of this initial judicial interpretation of section
404 (b) of the Act"' with respect to common rates for international
air cargo. The discretion of the CAB to order common rates in
some markets and to prescribe mileage rates in other routes has
been approved by the court of appeals in Virginia v. CAB without
a pronouncement that distinguishing circumstances must be dem-
onstrated by the agency. In the confusion, the Board has affirmed
92 Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. CAB, 298 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962).
" Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). A conclusion may be supported by substantial
evidence even though a plausible alternative interpretation of the evidence would
support a contrary view. Capital Intern. Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 392 F.2d 511
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
" Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Defi-
nition of Standards, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1055, 1072-97 (1962).
93 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 588 (1965); See
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55
(1965); But compare City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir. 1965).
91 "It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of
litigants and the opposite way between another." B. CARDOZA, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1921).
9 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(b), 49 U.S.C. S 1374(b) (1970).
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common rates from the northeast gateway cities to Far Eastern and
South American points." The CAB has also reversed its own de-
cision and equalized North Atlantic cargo rates to Europe from
Windsor, Canada and Detroit." Other cities, such as Seattle which
is equalized with San Francisco, may seek to realize their geograph-
ical advantage over competing ports by challenging both domestic
and international common rates. In this respect, the decision of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Virginia v. CAB has created a
need for guidelines for the CAB determination of alternative rate
structure in air transportation.
Ned W. Graber
98 CAB Order No. 73-12-77 (Dec. 19, 1973); CAB Order No. 74-1-130
(Jan. 29, 1974).
"CAB Order No. 74-7-130 (July 29, 1974).
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